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WHETHER Russia was a truly absolutist state 1 and if so when it became one 2 have been matters of dispute among historians. One must begin, therefore, by considering what the essential components of absolutism are and in which period of Russian history they are first to be observed. There is general agreement that absolutism is a form of monarchical power untrammelled by any other institution, whether noble privilege, representative assembly or the Church; that it is supported by a justificatory ideology and exercised by a professional bureaucracy (as well as by armed force). Furthermore absolutism is commonly associated with the codification of laws applicable to the entire realm, with the organisation of a professional standing army, and with the pursuit of 'mercantilist' policies designed to enrich the ruler and the state. 3 In the case of Russia absolutism is commonly associated with the country's westernisation and particularly with the period 1700-25, in the reign of Peter the Great. However, while Peter placed the coping stone on the absolutist system, the chief elements of absolutism (as defined above) were already established by 1700. The period 1650-1725, favoured by some historians,4 is therefore a more accurate designation, and the reign of Peter's father, Tsar Alexis (1645-76), can be taken as decisive, since it was in those years, particularly after 1652, that the various elements of absolutism were introduced or entrenched.
However, all this grew out of features present earlier in Russian history. These must be examined if one is to understand why absolutism took on a more complete form, and lasted longer, in Russia than in any other European state. At the same time they suggest why neighbouring Poland, which shared many of Russia's characteristics (economic backwardness, demographic weakness, a poorly developed legal system and an unbalanced society dominated by the land-owning nobility), took a different direction. Poland became decentralised to the point of being unable to maintain its integrity as a state at precisely the same time as absolute royal power was consolidated in Russia.
The roots of Russian absolutism are to be found in the confluence of several developments in the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Of great importance was the fact that (unlike Poland) the state won its competition with the Muscovite seigneurs for the lion's share of the peasantry's surplus product, and was able to increase the value it extracted from the overwhelmingly agrarian economy.5 At the same time territorial expansion increased the resources available to the state, 6 allowing the ruler to grant land tenures in return for personal service to him without the right, as formerly, for the grantee to take employment with another prince. In the 1480s and 1490s Novgorod, a city-state which enjoyed profitable trade with the West, was captured and Mongol suzerainty over the Russian lands came to an end. 7 Together, these developments were crucial to the growth of Moscow's power. 8 Territorial expansion continued through the sixteenth century with the conquest of the Tatar khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan' and eastern Siberia. However, the costs of war, not least Ivan IV's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to gain an outlet to the Baltic, increased the financial pressure on the state. It responded by increasing the squeeze on both the peasantry and the seigneurs; and by leeching resources from the extensive monastic estates. Other important developments were associated with these trends: the state intruded into the area of rent-fixing, the distinction between land held in heredity and in return for service began to disappear, and the traditional customary law began to decline. 9 Meanwhile the bureaucracy expanded and the military establishment was increased. Ivan IV (1530-84) founded a corps of musketeers (strel'tsy) and tripled the number of service gentry to some 1600, allocating them lands for their support within a day's ride (c. 42 miles) of Moscow. He nevertheless experienced difficulties in maintaining the growth of the-state apparatus and at the same time keeping the loyalty of some of his servitors, particularly sections of the higher nobility (some with princely titles and considerable hereditary estates).10 It is in this context that the reign of terror which he carried out, against both refractory aristocrats and cities, notably Novgorod and Pskov which sought to preserve vestiges of their traditional rights, must be considered. Ivan also disposed of the head of the Russian Church, Metropolitan Philip, who protested against his raw exercise of power and, not least, his battening on the resources of the Church.
It should also be noted that the growing power of the monarch was supported by a justificatory ideology which drew increasingly on the Byzantine tradition. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 had raised Muscovy to the status of the leading power in the Orthodox Christian world; and the marriage of Ivan III to Zoe Palaeologus, niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium, in 1472 enhanced Muscovy's prestige. 11 It also brought many more Greeks to Moscow where they were to playa significant role in developing the nascent bureaucracy and in introducing the idea of Byzantine autocracy to the Muscovite court. 12 At the same time ideas imported from the Romanian lands bolstered the idea of the monarch's supremacy over the Church as well as the laity. 13 The successes and failures of Ivan IV contributed to a series of disasters which overtook Russia in the second half of the sixteenth century. The pressure on the peasantry, who were obliged to pay dues according to their capacity rather than any fixed norm,14 continued to grow, as many lords increased their burdens in order to support their own obligations to the state. In reaction peasant flight increased, both to larger landlords who were able to offer better conditions and to unpoliced Siberia or the Cossack communities in the south. 15 In turn, this led to increasingly vociferous demands, especially from the smaller service gentry, for the peasants' right of movement to be withdrawn. At the same time there was a marked fall in the productivity of the central agricultural region, partly because of the depredations of Ivan's oprichnina, partly because of a change in climate (the advent of the 'Little Ice Age') which caused serious famines and consequent rebellions at the beginning of the seventeenth century. These disorders were compounded by the death of Ivan's successor, the childless Fedor (1598), which ended the dynastic line, called the legitimacy of his successor Boris Godunov (1598-1605) into question, encouraged Polish intervention in support of the impostor Dmitrii, Fedor's step-brother who had died in 1591, and led to a Polish occupation of Moscow itself.
After much tumult a rising patriotic movement succeeded in expelling the Poles and Michael Romanov was installed as tsar in 1613. But the intervening 'Time of Troubles' had eroded the chances of establishing the absolutism which Ivan IV had fostered. The legitimacy of tsars continued to be questioned: 16 and it had become the practice to call an Assembly of the Land (zemskii sobor), an institution established by Ivan IV to provide a counterweight to the aristocracy, in order to elect tsars or confirm them in office. As in Poland, where elective kingship had been established since 1570, this allowed the Assembly to place limitations on the monarch's powers. There is evidence that Tsar Michael was barred from dispensing personal justice in cases involving noblemen and that he had to seek the Assembly's consent before declaring war or concluding a peace. 17 Furthermore, the regency of the Patriarch Filaret (Michael's father) during the tsar's minority and the considerable political authority he exercised thereafter served, as we shall see, as a precedent for the Church to assert its authority vis a vis the tsar. Nevertheless, some foundations on which absolutism might be constructed had survived the Time of Troubles. The bureaucratic system had not only survived but been extended. 18 The power of the old aristocrats had not been revived (although they continued to jockey for high office), and the memory of Ivan IV continued to serve as an inspirational model for centralising tsars.19 Furthermore it can be argued that the Time of Troubles created a popular, though by no means universal, yearning for order -fertile soil for absolutism. However, in 1645 when the 16-year-old Alexis mounted the throne, absolutism was no more than a potentiality and there were a number of obstacles that blocked its realisation.
Although Alexis was the first tsar since Dmitrii to succeed by hereditary right and without election, the essential vulnerability of his position constrained him to call Assemblies of the Land before enacting important legislation or declaring war. Respect for his person was anything but universal, as was respect for authority in general. The immense size of the state (by 1649 Russian explorers had penetrated as far as the Pacific 20) and slow, difficult communications made for ineffective administration. Localism was still rife, pagan practices commonplace in the rural outback, and religious piety on the wane in the towns. The law itself was a farrago of canon law and edicts, unevenly enforced, while, despite its decline, customary law remained strong in the countryside. The tsar's youth encouraged factional fights at court, and the conflicts became open during the Moscow uprising of 1648. 21 Nevertheless, within three decades all these obstacles had been swept aside and the tsar's power was absolute.
In examining how the situation was turned round we shall first examine how the monarchy promoted deference and order, and then how the institutional constraints were overcome. Finally, the questions of military and economic policies will be considered.
One of the tsar's first steps to promote authority was to support a movement for religious revival which in several respects resembled the Counter-Reformation backed by the Habsburgs in Austria, Bohemia and, less successfully, in Hungary. 22 Alexis sponsored a missionary movement, known as the 'Zealots of Piety', among the clergy, let it be known that his own religious observance was extremely strict, and used public occasions, such as his marriage in 1646, to set an example of decorous abstemiousness. Edicts were issued that enjoined the public at large to sobriety, sabbatarianism and avoidance of 'godless amusements'.23 That of December 1648 condemned witchcraft, a variety of popular customs of pagan origin, and the activities of itinerant minstrels (skomorokhy) whose entertainments included subversive satires against the powerful. 24 Popular preachers were encouraged in the cities, while missionising zealots, often supported by troops, were sent into the countryside. 25 At the same time the miraculous discovery of icons and the miraculous cures effected by holy relics were publicised by lavish ceremonies and by pilgrimages to the shrines of saints who were reckoned to have a desirably exemplary effect upon the public. The tsar himself often participated in these. 26 This reflected a symbiosis between State and Church, which, to judge from both his writings and his actions, formed an essential part of the tsar's political philosophy, and was largely Byzantine in its origins. The stress on ceremonial probably derives from the Book of Ceremonies of the tenth-century Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. According to this, ceremony reflected 'the harmonious movement of ... the Creator around the universe' and helped to preserve 'Imperial power . . . in proportion and order,.27 Certainly Tsar Alexis' writings frequently refer to good order and proportion. 28 Furthermore, he not only acquired replicas of the Byzantine imperial regalia,29 but subscribed to the Byzantine view of divine right. This held that the monarch was God's sole agent on earth and answerable only to Him. However, the tsar's view of his role also drew on other sources -on the purported advice of Aristotle to Alexander the Great,30 on stories about the fifteenth-century prince of Wallachia, Vlad Tepes (Dracula);31 and on the Russian religious tradition. Though the latter taught that to wield power inevitably involved sinning, it was also understood that disobedient subjects forced the monarch to punish them by way of fulfilling his divine charge; and that although the stern punishments he meted out put his mortal soul in jeopardy this in itself gave him something of a Christ-like aura since he suffered for the sins of his subjects. The ideology also gave him the right to reward and punish without reference to other authorities, including the Church. The fact that he acted on these assumptions is shown by the long lists of promotions and demotions which Alexis dealt with personally; by an extraordinary admonition he composed, threatening perdition to as well as ordering the imprisonment of, a senior monk who had acted against a section of musketeers stationed at his monastery;32 and by his Latin motto 'By forbidding and commanding he alone rules and protects'. 33 However, an absolutist ideology does not necessarily imply absolutist rule, and in fact as a young man Alexis had had difficulty in asserting his personal authority, especially once his childhood governor and Chief Minister, Boris Morozov, was forced to step down as a result of the uprising of 1648. The turning points came in February 1652 when Alexis dismissed the head of the Palace Office, Prince A. M. L'vov, and in 1654 when he set up a Private Office. This office was staffed initially by only three bureaucrats, the chief of whom was given the title 'Secretary in the Sovereign's Name',34 but the staff tripled within five years and it continued to grow thereafter. Steps were also taken to give the Private Office staff special training, and from 1664 a school was set up for new entrants who, among other subjects, were taught Latin and grammar. 35 Meanwhile the influence of the office grew as able men who had served in it were posted to senior bureaucratic positions in various key departments of state.
The tsar's Private Office was the motor of absolutism in Russia. 36 It gave the tsar direct and immediate communication with all parts of the bureaucratic system, by-passing normal hierarchical channels, and allowed him to intervene directly in any kind of matter, whether sensitive Church affairs or foreign intelligence operations. It was the tsar's instrument for exercising personal authority, not least in gingering up the entire government machine. Through the few remaining records of its activities it is possible to reconstruct the monarch's personal involvement in government, at least in the latter part of his reign. 37 Yet there were important developments even in his first years as tsar, not least the first thorough codification of the laws of Russia in 1649.
This was an essential prerequisite for orderly government and again it was inspired by the Byzantine example. Earlier attempts had been made to establish the law and bring order to the legal system. The most recent was Ivan IV's Sudebnik of 1550. Since then, however, the accumulation of decrees and judicial decisions, many of them conflicting, had promoted a good deal of confusion and a lack of uniform application across the realm. The new Law Code (Ulozhenie)38 included some important new legislation, but its major purpose was to establish what the law actually was and the principles by which it should be administered. Drawing both on canon law and on the corpus of Roman Law, notably the legislation of Leo the Wise, it prescribed standard procedures, ordained that justice be applied without regard to rank, and laid down punishments for aberrant judges. It also served the cause of absolutism by setting down strict rules to protect the monarch's security and honour. The implementation of the sovereign's will was not to be influenced by any powerful person who might stand in its way, but the Code gave no indication that the tsar himself was legally bound.
The reforms concerning townsmen, monasteries and serfdom that were incorporated into the Code are also significant in the context of this essay. Protests by townsmen who were aggrieved by having to carry a high taxation burden while their competitors who happened to be subject to the Church or to individual magnates were exempt, loomed large in the riots of 1648. The Code rectified the position by confiscating hitherto untaxed urban Church and seigneurial property to the crown. In addition a new department of state was established to administer, and tax, estates belonging to the Church. However, the tsar, by special dispensation, was to exempt the property of the Patriarch from taxation and allow him
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to carry out some of the new Monastery Office's function. There was to be no outright dissolution of the monasteries as in England, and indeed monastery property continued to increase through legacy, gift and purchase during the reign. 39 Nonetheless the resources of the Church were made available to the monarch and were exploited in times of exigency, particularly for war.
A more significant measure, and one frequently associated with the establishment of absolutism in Russia, was the Code's final imposition of serfdom on the peasants. It has been claimed that absolutism in Russia was nothing less than 'a device for the consolidation of serfdom'. 40 In fact the opposite is true. The culmination of the enserfment process was prompted by representations from the service gentry who needed a captive labour force to maintain the incomes from their land allotments (pomest'e) at a level adequate for them to sustain their service obligations to the state. 41 Furthermore, placing peasants under the jurisdiction of the seigneurs eased the state's task of keeping effective control of the rural population. In any case the enserfment of the Russian peasantry was a means of strengthening the state.
While the Private Office provided a means of direct monarchical interference in every aspect of the country's life, the Law Code of 1649, and the supplemental criminal code of 1669, countered the notorious instability of laws,42 providing a framework of common law applicable throughout the realm that was not to be superseded until the nineteenth century. It was a fundamental support both to the monarch's attempts to knit his vast and heterogeneous possessions together and to the establishment of absolutism itself.
However, laws can be superseded and government machinery dismantled or destroyed. Historians of Russia have customarily pointed to institutions which had a capacity to challenge or impede the rise of absolutism: (i) the aristocracy and the system of precedence governing appointments (mestnichestvo); (ii) the Council of State (Duma); (iii) the Assembly of the Land (zemskii sobor) and (iv) the Church. The potential which each of these institutions had to limit monarchical authority is worth examination.
The aristocracy in Russia is difficult to define. The only hereditary title before the eighteenth century was that of prince. This denoted descent from the legendary Varangian ruler, Riurik, but since primogeniture did not exist in Russia (or anywhere else in the Slavonic world) the title was no indication that the bearer possessed sufficient wealth to sustain his status, or that he wielded political power. The descendants of the old appanage princes' retainers constituted another 'noble' element (sometimes termed 'untitled aristocrats'); there were also a number of families, such as the Morozovs, who had risen to prominence comparatively recently, thanks to gaining high political offices. The power of the aristocracy to impede the monarch rested on the extent of their landed property and the offices they held, especially in so far as this was governed by the rules of precedence (mestnichestvo), but above all by their capacity to act together as a coherent interest group.
However, though substantial landed magnates were to be found in Russia in the mid-seventeenth century, there was none to compare with those of Poland-Lithuania who (like the Radziwills for example) were not only immensely wealthy, but also hereditary office-holders and possessors of private armies. Furthermore Russia's great landlords seem to have had no sense of common interest or identity as did the service gentry. Since the aristocracy presented him with no coherent challenge, the monarch was able to deal with them on an individual basis. Thus, Prince Iakov Cherkaskii, who opposed certain clauses in the draft Law Code, was simply dismissed from office in 1648, as Prince L'vov was to be subsequently. On the other hand Prince Nikita Odoevskii, also a member of the old, titled elite and a personage of considerable landed wealth, who was a devoted subject of the tsar, was given a variety of high offices during his long career and enjoyed the monarch's confidence and friendship. In short, social status and wealth constituted no obstacle to absolutism. The institution of mestnichestvo, however, did.
This was a complicated system of allotting court and military duties in accordance with precedents decided by the positions one's ancestors or relatives had held; it may have served to satisfy aristocrats' senses of honour and contain feuding between them;43 it certainly interfered with the monarch's freedom to make appointments. However, although the Books of Precedence on which the system was based were not to be ceremoniously burned until 1682, mestnichestvo had been inoperative in determining appointments and promotions of any consequence for several decades before that. Military campaigns and important ceremonial occasions at court were regularly proclaimed to be exempt from 184 ABSOLUTISM IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE the rules, and though many appeals were made on grounds of precedence, there seems to be no record of any of them being upheld, while there is evidence that many of the appellants were punished. The tsar's own attitude was clearly expressed in 1667 when an old aristocrat protested at being placed below the recently appointed foreign minister who came of much humbler, gentry stock. In delivering judgement the head of the office governing appointments declared that ancestral precedents in such cases 'had not counted, do not count now, and will not count in future'. 44
It had also been customary to expect promotion to the rank of boiar (the highest of the Council, or Duma ranks)45 if one's father had held it. However, in a letter to V. B. Sheremet'ev in 1658 the tsar explained that the son of a boiar should neither expect to reach that rank nor boast about it if he did. 46 In fact the composition of the Council changed considerably between the 1640s and the 1670s, from a membership which was 70 per cent aristocratic to one that was barely 25 per cent aristocratic. At the same time members of gentry origins increased from barely a quarter to over half the total number, while the number of commoner bureaucrats rose from one to five. 45 The role of the Council of State (Duma) has often been misunderstood. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, if not earlier, it had the character of a Council of Ministers. Although the first four ranks in the service hierarchy are termed 'Council ranks', generals, administrators with postings outside Moscow, and others who held one of these ranks but did not head important government departments (prikazy) did not normally attend Council meetings. It is worth noting that in the earlier part of his reign Alexis made almost a hundred appointments to the first two Council ranks (boiar and okol'nichii) , which had the effect of diminishing the honour, while between 1660 and his death in 1676 he made only thirty-six such promotions (besides at least one demotion). More significantly, the tsar preferred to consult his Councillors individually or in committee, and discouraged them from discussing state affairs with each other when he was not present. 48 Full Council meetings were held progressively more rarely, and chiefly for ceremonial purposes. While there are good grounds, then, for believing that in the first half of the century the tsar did not act without the Council, from the early 1650s, in the words of a contemporary observer, he governed the state 'as he wished'. 49
Similar tendencies are to be observed in respect of the Assembly of the Land. This 'parliament' usually included representatives of the gentry and townsmen, from both Moscow and the provinces, as well as Councillors and, when occasion called for them, clergy; but never peasants. The Assembly has often been regarded as a socially representative institution which had the potential to develop into a genuine parliament. However, this view seems to have stemmed from the wishful thinking of pre-Revolutionary liberal historians who were searching for precedents to justify Russia's conversion into a constitutional democratic state. It must be doubted if the Assembly of the Land ever had such a potential. From its very foundation in 1549 it had been an instrument of the monarchy. It was summoned on an irregular basis; its membership was defined according to the particular purpose for which it was called; and it never had any defined powers of its own. It served variously from time to time as a sounding board, as a means of gauging the acceptability of a proposed measure, of assuaging discontent, establishing what the customary law was, and of drumming up support. Convened quite frequently until 1653, when it was used to endorse the decision to go to war with PolandLithuania over Ukraine, it was not resorted to again until the early 1680s, on the last occasion, in connection with the conclusion of a peace with Poland. 50 In Poland, by contrast, the Sejm had developed into a powerful force, dominated by the landed nobility and gentry (szlachta) , that was able to block all attempts to develop an effective centralised government. Polish influence may well have led the Russian Assembly of 1613 to impose limitations on Tsar Michael's powers as a condition of his election, but there is no evidence of its exercising any power thereafter. Indeed, it seems to have become an unspoken assumption that Russia must not follow the Polish example. The Assembly was fundamentally a support for absolutism and by the end of the century it had been abandoned, there being no further need for it.
Of all the institutions that might have prevented the establishment of absolutism, the most important was the Church. In Russia, as in Byzantium, Church and Emperor were supposed to work in symphony together, though in practice the Emperor usually prevailed in any dispute between them. However, the Church's role as a focus for patriotic feeling during the Polish intervention at the beginning of the century, and the fact that Tsar Michael's father, the Patriarch Filaret, ruled the country during the early years of the Romanov dynasty gave the Church greater political potential. This was heightened by the prominent role given to the Church in promoting the religious revival of the 1650s. At the installation of the Patriarch Nikon in 1652 courtiers as well as clerics who were present were called upon to kneel and swear to obey him as their archpastor and spiritual father. The fact that the tsar himself had knelt at the tomb of the newly canonised St Philip, the Metropolitan whom Ivan IV had had murdered, has given credence to the view that the Church was gaining an ascendancy over the state, even though the tsar intended to use the canonisation of St Philip as a symbol of reconciliation between the victim and his murderer. 51 However, although in 1654 Nikon was accorded the same high title that Filaret had borne (velikii gosudar') and which tsars themselves used, it reflected no more than the fact that he was designated regent while the tsar himself was away on campaign (1654-6). Shortly after his return to Moscow Alexis broke with Nikon. When the latter abandoned his see in protest at the tsar's disfavour and laid down conditions for his return, the tsar refused to accede to them;52 despite canonical difficulties, he had the Patriarch deposed by a special synod held in Moscow in 1666. 53 The fact that Nikon attracted scant support from either clergy or laity may be explained in part by his association with the liturgical reforms which he had forced through at the tsar's behest in the 1650s and which were highly unpopular with Russian traditionalists. However, these were confirmed by synod (with the tsar's approval) at the beginning of 1667, soon after Nikon's condemnation.
The long apologia which Nikon composed after he lost the tsar's favour betray distinct theocratic tendencies. 54 However, there is no evidence that he held such views, which were not usual in the Russian Church, while he was serving as Patriarch. The tsar himself had little difficulty in imposing his own choice of Nikon's successor upon the synod; and at the next patriarchal election of 1672 the synod openly declared its readiness to elect whomsoever the tsar chose. 55 The Church had been confirmed as an instrument of the state, even though the patriarchate itself was not to be abolished, and its role transferred to a largely secularised Office of the Holy Synod, until the reign of Peter.
One notes with interest that the spate of canonisations of the early 1650s, chiefly of patriotic Church hierarchs who would serve as exemplary models in the war against Poland, was to be the last. This is one index of a secularising trend to be observed from the 1650s and which is also seen in a degree of free-thinking and a rejection of icon-veneration on the part of sections of the urban population. This has been attributed to economic growth and the concomitant development of city life. 56 Secularisation may not always be associated with absolutism, but in the case of Russia the tendency (which was to reach its apogee under Peter) was associated not only with urbanisation and the promotion of secular ideas at court, but with one of the chief characteristics of absolutist states, the creation of a 'modern' (and in the Russian case, a 'westernised') army.
Although this phenomenon is commonly associated with Peter, it had its origins in the sixteenth century when Ivan IV established a corps of musketeers (strel'tsy) and when a government department was set up to regulate the employment of Polish mercenaries (Panskii Prikaz). The Office was subsequently renamed the 'Foreigners' Office' (Inozemskii Prikaz), to reflect the fact that professional soldiers were being engaged from many countries apart from Poland, not least Irish and Scots 'wild Geese'. 57 This influx of foreign officers and NCOs saw a very considerable increase in the 1650s and 1660s,58 and was to have great importance for the development of the state.
Modernisation was not confined to improving weaponry and tactics; the army was to a large extent regularised too. The service gentry levies and peasant recruits were gradually formed into upto-date cuirassier, dragoon and infantry regiments, subjected to strict discipline and proper training, in order to make them capable of fighting modern armies like that of Sweden as well as the traditional cavalry armies of Poland. 59 Due to the exigencies of war, with Poland (1654-67) and with Sweden (1655-7) and the financial difficulties which flowed from it, the modernisation proceeded by fits and starts rather than at an even rate, but it was to have profound political as well as social, economic and cultural consequences.
In the short term it provoked disaffection and then rebellion on the part of some traditional military elements who perceived themselves to be obsolescent, especially the strel'tsy who bore some resemblance, not least in their trading privileges, to the janissaries of Ottoman Turkey. They proved unreliable in the Moscow risings of 1648 and 1662, and downright rebellious in the 1680s and later 1690s. 60 Resentment of 'regularisation' also gave rise to more diffuse protest, including mass desertions, on the part of other categories. The service gentry, however, remained loyal to the crown out of economic self-interest, because of their dependence on serf labour and for fear that the crown would punish disobedience by sequestering their lands. Also the troops of 'new formation', officered chiefly by foreign mercenaries who subjected their men to draconian discipline, constituted a powerful instrument for imposing civil order, as they proved in suppressing the Moscow rising of 1662. 61 In the longer term the influx of foreign experts, not only of soldiers but also of physicians, entrepreneurs, horticulturalists and professionals of all kinds,62 had the cumulative effect of breaching the walls of Russian isolationism and, in so far as they were introduced by the crown, gave Russian absolutism a distinctly western character. Incipient westernisation aroused popular xenophobia. In attempts to assuage these feelings, foreigners in Moscow were confined to a special suburb in 1649,63 and decrees were subsequently issued restricting the wearing of clothes cut in the western fashion. 64 However, the tsar himself remained committed to the West, partly because it was a source of modern technology and expertise, partly for reasons of his international prestige. The embassies he sent to England, France, Venice, Florence and Spain, as well as to the Habsburg court, Denmark and elsewhere, were intended to assert Russia's interests, raise the profile of the tsar internationally, and to gather information, not least on how western monarchs bore themselves. 65 The tsar's foreign agents (for example the Englishman John Nebdon) were asked, among their other commissions, to report on the panoply of western courts 66 so that the tsar might emulate his peers.
Emulation of the West is observable in policy as well as in outward show, and the programme of military reconstruction had its parallel in economic policy -notably the adoption of 'mercantilism'. In implementing its policies Russia had an advantage in that the crown itself was the largest merchant in the realm, controlled the silk trade with Persia, and held monopolies of rhubarb, furs and other products. It was also in a much better position to determine the terms of its international trade, notably with the English and Dutch at Archangel, than the Poles could theirs through Gdansk. Furthermore the most substantial Russian merchants (gosti) worked closely with the crown, which they served in the capacity of customs officers, agents and commercial advisers. 67 On the other hand Russia was at a disadvantage in lacking a port on the Baltic, in being comparatively backward industrially, and in having an internal market which despite its growth was still comparatively underdeveloped. The measures adopted by the state to overcome these disadvantages in the third quarter of the seventeenth century suggest the extent to which it embraced the philosophy of 'mercantilism'.
The war of 1655-7 with Sweden aimed (as Ivan IV's Narva campaigns had done) to gain an outlet to the Baltic and hence a much more direct, and cheaper, access to the West than through Archangel, which was iced up for most of the year and involved a dangerous voyage round the North Cape. The attempt to capture Riga failed; so did a diplomatic offensive to obtain docking rights there for Russian ships.68 It was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century when St Petersburg was constructed on a tract of marshland wrested from the Swedes, and when the powerful naval base at Kronstadt was built, that Russia obtained a Baltic port and the opportunity to become a naval as well as a land power. Meanwhile, however, a flotilla of modern warships, including a frigate, had been built by Dutchmen specially engaged for the purpose. It was based at the Caspian port of Astrakhan' and the intention was to use it both against the pirates who were plaguing the trade route to Persia, and to find (as it was hoped) a route across the Caspian to the East Indies. However, the flotilla was destroyed by the Cossack rebel, Stepan Razin, in 1670. 69 Although, for the moment, Russia was incapable of competing with Holland, France and England as an international trading power, attempts were made to generate more industrial activity. Mineral prospecting had long been encouraged for obvious military and financial reasons, and the state had also established an arms-manufacturing centre at Tula, to the south of Moscow.. This centre saw a considerable expansion during the century, but the state's efforts to promote industry were not confined to those projects with a military purpose. It also established glass, brick and textile manufactories and another for making agricultural implements. Most of these enterprises were run by the crown, which already possessed the best crafts centre in the country, the Kremlin Armoury, as well as a state pharmacy (Aptekar'skii Prikaz) which was to some extent a centre for scientific research, not least of the hermetic kind. 70 At the same time, traditional industries (salt-gathering, potash-burning, tanning, distilling, etc.) also saw further development. 71 More remarkable, perhaps, were the state's attempts to develop what might be termed a 'mercantilist agriculture' .
This involved the introduction of new crops (sometimes, as in the case of mulberry trees for silk-worms, on an experimental basis) or better strains of crops (spring wheat, melons, peas, vines, flax, hemp, etc.), chiefly on lands owned by the crown. The court estates were also used for the improvement of dairy-farming, stock-rearing and horse-breeding. Irrigation systems, powered by windmills as well as by the already customary water-mills, were installed, fenlands drained, fishponds dug, and an experimental five-field system of crop rotation was also introduced. 72 Large estates had always spearheaded agricultural improvement, and it is hardly surprising that the crown estates should have been used in this way. Nevertheless a change can be detected in the seventeenth century, from the exploitation of crown lands and workshops merely for the purpose of maintaining the court's economic autarchy to their use in promoting economic improvements for the state as a whole.
Another means employed to promote economic development was legislation. In 1665 the city of Pskov was granted a measure of self-government and a series of commercial privileges including the right to hold two fairs a year. 73 The architect of this experiment was a man of gentry origins whom the tsar had promoted to high office, Afanasy Ordyn-Nashchokin. Nashchokin was also largely responsible for the Commercial Statute of 1667. This set out (after the manner of Colbert) to protect trade both from foreign competition and from Russian officialdom. Foreign merchants were confined to dealing at ports and frontier towns unless they paid substantial additional taxes; they were barred from dealing with each other without payment of duty, and excluded from the retail sector. Duties were to be collected in gold or hard currency at artificially fixed exchange rates and the export of precious metals was banned. Sumptuary laws were also introduced (which dictated what clothing particular social groups could wear), associations of townsmen were encouraged to form banks, and credit was eased to help the formation of merchant companies. 74 The results of these policies, many of which were pursued into the eighteenth century, may have disappointed expectations (though they certainly helped to quieten native merchant protest). Nonetheless during the seventeenth century the Russian economy acquired a dynamism which was signally lacking in Poland. The internal market became state-wide, river traffic increased, and the urban classes grew in size, obtained greater privileges, and became more prosperous. 75 This formed a basis from which Russia was to rise to the status of a great power. Much of the inspiration for the state's mercantilist policies came from abroad, through the mediation of men like Andrei Vinnius. Born in Amsterdam, Vinnius became both a registered merchant in Moscow and a Dutch translator in the Foreign Office (Posol'skii prikaz), rising to the rank of full secretary. He proposed several schemes for the economic betterment of the state to the tsar, and was employed by him on several head-hunting expeditions for foreign experts who might help realise them. 76 Vinnius, indeed, may have been one of those responsible for introducing the concepts of the 'police state' into Russia -that is, the notion (originating with the Jesuits in Peru) that it was possible to improve society through the application of rules. 77 These ideas, developed in a number of German states, practised by Colbert in France and in the Prussia of Frederick William I, also had their influence on the seventeenth-century Kremlin 78 and were to be observed, too, in the Russia of Peter I.
Given the weakness of all Russian institutions apart from the monarchy itself, the assumption and exercise of absolute powers might seem a straightforward matter and the genesis of the Russian police state an unremarkable concomitant. However, Russia faced one difficulty in implementing the absolutist programme that other European powers did not share, at least to the same degree -the problem of distance. In the conquest of Siberia (as in the American West) the state followed rather than led the pioneers. 79 Furthermore, effective control of its immense territories, always problematical, was often virtually impossible especially towards the periphery because of the distances involved and
the difficulty of the routes. Even the central zones were covered to a much greater extent than today, with dense forests that provided cover for deserters, religious dissenters, rebels, and highwaymen. 80 Newly conquered territories like Ukraine proved difficult to digest while the Cossack settlements to the south remained virtually autonomous, and often rebellious, down to the early eighteenth century, and in the cases of Zaporozh'e and the Ural River until the 1770s.
The steps taken to remedy these problems were not entirely unsuccessful, however. In the third quarter of the seventeenth century the post system (inherited from the Mongols) was .much improved and regular courier routes were established to connect Moscow with Siberia, Archangel, Kiev, Riga and points farther west. 81 Embassies sent to China and India were ordered not only to report on the best routes but to engage masons and engineers capable of building stone bridges. At the same time trees were cleared on either side of the roads leading to Moscow to preclude ambushes of travellers by robbers. 82 By 1675, then, absolutism had been firmly established in Russia and absolutist policies were being implemented in many spheres. The state was greatly expanded, and several attempts to challenge the tsar's authority had been beaten down. After Alexis' death in 1676, however, the system he had erected seemed somewhat vulnerable. His eldest surviving son, Fedor (regnat burned the Books of Precedence, but felt the need to invoke the support of the Patriarch and an Assembly of the Land before doing so. The tsar's Private Office was dismantled; so was the Monastery Department. Then, on Fedor's death, rivalry between the families of Alexis' two wives, the Miloslavskiis and Naryshkins, created openings both for religious dissenters (the 'Old Believers' who rejected the reformed liturgy) and the aggrieved strel'tsy who took control of Moscow for several weeks under the ambitious Prince Khovanskii. This gave the Patriarch a heightened role as a political mediator.
It is an index of the fundamental strength of the absolutist state which Alexis had bequeathed, that it survived these turmoils. Under the regency of Alexis' daughter Sophia (1682-9) Khovanskii was executed and the arch-dissenter the Archpriest A vvakum burned at the stake. Westernising policies were continued under her chief minister, and devotee of Machiavelli, Prince Golitsyn,83 until his fall following an unsuccessful campaign against the Turks. Upon assuming power, Alexis' youngest son, Peter, followed most of his father's policies, even to the extent of reviving the Private Office under another name, and pressed them further. By his death in 1725 Russia's absolutist system had been perfected.
Absolutism was established in Russia at roughly the same time as in Denmark, Sweden and Prussia-Brandenburg. All four states were influenced by the example of Poland which, lacking the stimulus of powerful neighbours for too long perhaps, had sunk into an anarchy of localism. Its irreversible decentralisation turned it into a power vacuum which invited regular foreign interference in its affairs from the mid seventeenth century, though it was not to disappear from the political map of Europe until the late eighteenth century. By contrast, Russia's absolutist system was to survive, with remarkably little reconstruction, into the twentieth century, outlasting all others in Europe. His treatment of Russia, which suffers from an overly ideological approach not seen in the best of Soviet writing on the subject, is particularly misleading.
41. The peasant's traditional right to terminate his tenancy on St George's Day, in November, after the harvest, had first been suspended on a temporary basis in the late sixteenth century. The suspensions were repeated and their length extended. At the same time the periods within which a runaway peasant could be hunted down and returned to his lord were lengthened. See Smith, Enserfment, and Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the 9th to the 19th Centuries (New York, 1967). The code abolished the time limits altogether and placed the peasant under the jurisdiction of his lord. It might be noted that the reasons for enserfing the peasants of Poland were different in so far as the Polish seigneurs wished to exploit the grain-export boom to north-western Europe. The Polish state did not benefit from the development. Grain exports played a negligible role in the Russian case, though a general labour shortage was relevant to the imposition of serfdom in both states. See Blum, ' The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe', American Historical Review, 72, no. 4 (1957) (Moscow, 1964) pp. 168-205. 44. Longworth, Alexis, p. 190. 45 . The term boiar is commonly used far too loosely. Though in earlier periods it had denoted a member of the Grand Duke's retinue, in the seventeenth century it denotes a holder of the first of the four Council ranks, equivalent to the rank of Field Marshal and its civilian parallels in Peter I's Table of Ranks. 
